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foolish

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  1. Strictly research, my question is there an exception to the rule of 28 US.C 1491(a)(1) that a claim sounding in tort can't be maintained the court of federal claims? The reason I ask is because I believe I found an exception to the rule see e.g., Awad v. United States, 301 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("If an action arises `primarily from a contractual undertaking,' jurisdiction lies in the [Court of Federal Claims] `regardless of the fact that the loss resulted from the negligent manner in which defendant performed its contract.'" (quoting San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).(See internal citations) Do I understand that if the injured party is able to sufficiently prove that injuries they sustained would have not occurred or could not occur except through breach of contract then they could then a tort claim can be maintained becuase the injuries are attributtable to the breach? or claims sounding in tort?
  2. The reason why I linked both questions is because I thought the rule governed the timing of the filings whether its motions or briefs unless the court extends or shortens it, in my limited experience when the court sets a time for a motion or brief to be filed and its filed early that filing date triggers the amount of time set by the court for the response to be filed. The reason I asked is because if that was the case that the appellees missed the filing deadline of the opening brief. Therefore my concern is that when it files its response to the supplemental is does not exceed the scope of the issues raised in the supplemental brief or address the issues of the opening brief. That's why I combined the timing question with the scope of the supplemental question. I read Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 153, n13, which the timing to becomes more important.
  3. I have a question concerning being granted permission to file supplemental brief after the opening brief has been filed and a filing deadline that a court imposes. I believe I understand that the filing deadline of filing briefs and motions is normally governed by FRAP 27(3)(A) the 10 day filing deadline unless the court extends it or shortens it. Am I correct? Is so, My question is whether can appellee's address issues in their response to the supplement that It didn't bother filing a response to the opening brief. In other words are appellees only allowed to address issues raised in the supplement and not in the opening brief? The next question goes for example the court sets a filing deadline of 30 days from today April 08, 2019 to file the opening brief on May 08, 2019 and the appellee's response brief is set for June 08, 2019. But the appellant files the opening brief before the May 08, filing deadline. Is appellee's filing deadline triggered by appellant's early filing? In other-words is filing deadline moved to when appellant' files the opening brief?
  4. No, I understand that that Court considered the ''the state of things on the day the complaint is filed in the Claims Court'', that's the point that I am struggling with its a complete waste of everybody's time by having refile these claims all over again and start anew. . . ([my inner thoughts ]this would have never gone on this long, had I not been deprived of the copy of the transcripts to those proceedings despite my timely countless of request, I was set-up for failure from day one, because otherwise they would have lost automatically had the transcripts seen the light of day..]). Thanks for the help.
  5. the complaint was dismissed on the latter, I understand that the court would lack jurisdiction over the case when their a similar pending case. Drawing the exception to this case by reversing its order or judgment where new evidence was proffered that the pending case dismissal order was based voluntarily dismissal was granted to clear the jurisdictional bar. (FRAP 42(b)). I am reading the interpretation of Keene Corp, 508 U.S. 200, 219-22 (dissent).
  6. I admit I typed some obvious mistakes for example (1) I cited 1915(d) which should have been subparagraph (e)(2) of sect. 1915: (2) I also placed "all" before the federal court of federal. That mistake was obvious in that there is only one court of federal claims which is national. But they were obvious to studied person in the practice of law. The remarks are for primarily for effect, but unnecessary, but I do appreciate positive input. Actually the screening aspect of the complaint as I experienced is to weed out defects in the complaint and allowing the plaintiff to correct any procedural or jurisdictional defect found in the complaint before serving the defendants, as my understanding pro se litigants are given an opportunity to correct any defects in the complaint that are correctable, if so The real question is this does 28 U.S.C sec. 1500 bar a court of federal claims from granting a rule 59e and or rule 60(b)(6) motion after the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction? I see no bar in the language used in sec. 1500. Am I wrong?.
  7. Does 28 U.S.C 1915(d) require all court of federal claims to screen complaints ? If so are pro se litigants moving informa pauperis given a chance to amend their complaint to correct any ''procedural'' or ''jurisdictional'' defect found in the complaint that is correctable?
  8. I understand that it was patent case, I was just beating my head against the wall, and I think it helped because I found 25 F.3d 1021, 1030, a FCL case stating that a rule 60(b) is to be liberally construed to do substantial justice. Hopefully I find something better in google scholar. case by case page by page.
  9. I must have though I cited the right case. The correct citation is 198 F.3d 1363, 1370, its a patent case where the plaintiff filed a belated Rule 60(b) motion, the Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The rule is the same but the circumstances are different, the motion was timely and supported grounds relief under the extraordinary circumstances catch all rule. But its not a district court case.
  10. To remain on solid ground, I need confirmation or correction. Does the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit case law equally apply to Federal Court of Claims when its an appeal from a denial of FRCP Rule 60(b)(6) catch all motion. see e.g., 138 F.3d 1363, 1370. I ask this question because according to 28 US.C 1346(a) vests both Courts with Tucker jurisdiction.
  11. What statute properly invokes the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction to review of a decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim. See e.g., 28 USC §1292(c), and §1295. Is there any statute or statutes that definitively invokes the courts of appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over an order appealed from the Federal Court of Claims.
  12. foolish

    OPTIONS

    I am a lawful permanent resident ('LPR') that had his LPR revoked, this revocation was litigated and eventually my LPR status was returned by the BIA. Basically, It held that my presence outside the U.S. was involuntary. Thus, comes need for information so that I weigh the legal options I might have open to me, my LPR status '[albeit] legally returned the LPR card was never returned to me. I have researched various options from boarding foils, the returning resident (sb-1) visa. ( https://visaguide.world/us-visa/immigrant/sb-1/) My question is would I qualify for not paying for the not paying for the renewal of the LPR card at filing fees in paragraph (B) of the reasons for the application (https://www.uscis.gov/i-90) since my LPR card was confiscated but never returned when my LPR status was reinstated? Let me explain a bit there continues to be circumstances beyond my control that has kept me from taking these steps in returning to the US. I could not have taken these any time sooner due to financial and legal reasons, but now medical urgency will end up eclipsing those circumstances, it seems that I must return to ensure that my Dad is a senior citizen tries CBD oil for his Parkinson's and other ailments to at-least.
  13. I agree, tell me about complex, in my case just by simply keeping a fundamental record out of my reach, which cause this to be over decade and half old litigation that could have been resolved in one look at the one document. I wouldn't wish this no one. Its waste on time and money, its taken a toll. . . a lot of heartache. . . . .I still believe in justice . . I appreciate the help.
  14. I Appreciate the education on this subject. I honestly believed concurrent jurisdiction meant that a claim could be brought in both courts, let me ask the district court has the authority to entertain both the little Tucker and claims sounding in Tort, that would be the advantage right with the District Court, while CFC there is no limit on monetary damages on the breach it cant be in Tort? Then wouldn't SOL be a factor?
  15. Overlooking the strikethrough, I get the gist of where you going because reviewed Tohono Odham Nation and Brandit as well as others the reason why asked was because of what Keene Corp v. U.S, 500 U.S. 200 , (1993) ''the Court of Federal Claims may not adjudicate the plaintiff's claim, even though its subject matter would otherwise bring it within the court's jurisdiction'' . . .Keene basically issued a proposition that the plaintiff he may choice withdraw contract claim in one to save the other (in the dissent I believe). Is that what I am reading? The issue about the operative facts, wouldn't the operative facts sprout different outcomes from consequences of the breach that actually become independent from the original operative facts that take a life of its own. (do you follow what I am trying say) For example in commercial contract laws it doesn't imply constitutions violations when their violated while this one does and the CFC doesn't entertain claims sounding in Tort while the district court does. I would be suing not for the breach but the Tort violations.
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